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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:
Priority No. 2

v.

:

WILLIAM R. LYDAY,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 970078-CA

:
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from convictions for possession of the controlled
substances methamphetamine and marijuana, within 1,000 feet of a public park,
respectively, a second degree felony and a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1996 and Supp. 1996). This Court has jurisdiction of the appeal
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Is the evidence sufficient to support the jury's determination that
defendant and codefendant jointly and constructively possessed the
methamphetamine and marijuana seized from the cab of a pickup over which they
had exclusive control?
The Court need not reach defendant's sufficiency challenge due to his
failure to properly marshal the supporting evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom

and to demonstrate their inadequacy. State v. Scheel, 823 P.2d 470, 473 (Utah App.
1991). If the Court deems defendant's challenge adequate for review, it should view the
evidence and the inferences from it in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. State
v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 819 (Utah App. 1994). The Court may reverse for insufficient
evidence "only when the evidence is so inclusive or so inherently improbably that
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed
the crime." Id. (citation omitted). See also State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1212 (Utah
1993).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. AND RULES
Any relevant text of constitutional, statutory, or rule provisions are
contained in the Addendum.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with possession of the controlled substances
methamphetamine and marijuana, within 1,000 feet of a public park, respectively, a
second degree felony and a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 5837-8 (1996 and Supp. 1996) (R. 1-2).

2

Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted as charged.1 The trial court
imposed a l-to-15 year term for the felony count and a concurrent 6 month term for the
misdemeanor count (R. 68-70).2
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal (R. 71).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The facts are recited in the light most favorable to the jury verdict. State v.
Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 819 (Utah App. 1994).
On 15 May 1996, defendant and codefendant Timmerman were arrested on
outstanding warrants by Brigham City police investigating a citizen complaint that the
two were stealing bricks from alongside the railroad tracks (R. 201-209). When the
officers first approached, codefendant Timmerman was sitting in a parked pickup truck
and defendant was approximately 50 yards distant, walking toward the truck (R. 202203).
As defendant approached, Officer Gerbich asked him if he had been driving
and defendant claimed that he had not (R. 204). Defendant presented a Utah
Identification Card and when asked, responded that he had no license and that he hoped

1

The verdict form appearing in this record pertains to codefendant Brent
William Timmerman (see R. 65). The verdict form pertaining to defendant is found in
the companion case, State v. Timmerman, Case No. 970076-CA at (R. 61).
2

There is no reason apparent in the record that the misdemeanor sentence
was entered for a Class B conviction, rather than a Class A conviction, a result
inconsistent with the charging information and the jury verdict (compare R. 1-2, and R.
68-70). Therefore, the case should be remanded so that the trial court can enter a class A
misdemeanor judgment and sentence that conforms with the jury verdict.

3

codefendant Timmerman did (R. 206). The officers then approached codefendant
Timmerman who was still seated in the pickup and asked for his identification (id).
Codefendant Timmerman, like defendant, produced a Utah Identification Card (id.)
When asked about his driver's license, codefendant Timmerman said that it had been
revoked or suspended (id.). A computer check for driver's licenses and outstanding
warrants confirmed that defendant had no license and that codefendant Timmerman's
license had been revoked for an alcohol violation (id.). Additionally, both defendants had
outstanding warrants (id.).
Following the arrest of defendant and codefendant Timmerman on the
outstanding warrants, Officer Broadhead searched the cab of the pickup and found
controlled substances (R. 209). In plain sight on the floor of the passenger area where
codefendant Timmerman had been sitting, the officer found a hard box of Camel
cigarettes (R. 209-11). Upon opening the cigarette box the officer found a small handrolled cigarette that smelled like, and appeared to be marijuana, sitting on top of a plastic
bag that had been wadded up and placed inside (R. 210). Underneath this baggie there
was a second baggie containing a brown colored substance which the officer, based on his
experience, believed was crank or methamphetamine (R. 211).
Also in plain sight, the officer saw approximately a 1/4 inch of a ziploc
baggie protruding from a Kleenex box sitting on the transmission hump (R. 214,227).
Officer Broadhead pushed the Kleenex inside away to reveal a quarter-sized ziploc baggie
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containing methamphetamine (R. 215). The cab of the pickup was otherwise empty,
except for an eyeglass case found on the passenger side floor (R. 226).
Both defendants denied any knowledge of the seized drugs (R. 228).
Rather, they claimed to have borrowed the truck from Barbara Evans, and to have driven
to the railroad tracks from Ogden earlier that morning for the purpose of collecting bricks
(R.239).
The officers transported the defendants to jail, but did not impound the
truck because defendants claimed that Evans would reclaim it (R. 220-21). When the
truck remained adjacent to the railroad tracks for the next 24 hours, police impounded it
(R.220).
The state crime lab confirmed that the brown substance in the baggies was
approximately 141 milligrams of methamphetamine and that the partially burned, handrolled cigarette contained marijuana (R. 249-52). Based on his training and experience,
Officer Broadhead estimated that a 141 milligrams of methamphetamine had an
approximate street value of $75.00 (R. 224).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Defendant's sufficiency challenge should be rejected because he has not
met the heavy burden of marshaling all of the evidence and the reasonable inferences
therefrom that support the jury verdict and then demonstrating that it is insufficient. Even
if the Court considers the merits of defendant's challenge, the Court must construe the
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facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the jury
verdict. So viewed, the evidence is sufficient.
ARGUMENT
THE JURY REASONABLY CONCLUDED THAT
DEFENDANT AND CODEFENDANT JOINTLY AND
CONSTRUCTIVELY POSSESSED THE $75.00 WORTH
OF DRUGS FOUND IN THE CAB OF THE PICKUP OVER
WHICH THEY HAD EXCLUSIVE CONTROL
A. Constructive Possession Standard
Actual physical possession is not necessary to convict for possession of
controlled substances. State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316,318 (Utah 1985). A conviction may
be based upon constructive possession of controlled substances when drugs are found "in
a place or under circumstances indicating that the defendant's have the ability and intent
to exercise dominion and control." State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127,131-32 (Utah 1987).
That is, there must be a "sufficient nexus between the accused and the drug to permit an
inference that the accused had both the power and intent to exercise dominion and
control." Fox, 709 P.2d at 319. This nexus may be established through circumstantial
evidence, State v. Carlson, 635 P.2d 72, 74 (Utah 1981), including the proximity of a
defendant to the drugs, and whether the drugs are in plain view. State v. Salas, 820 P.2d
1386,1388 (Utah 1991). Codefendants may jointly, constructively possess contraband.
Carlson. 635 P.2d at 74.
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B. Joint Constructive Possession Adequately Established
Here, defendant and codefendant had exclusive control of the pickup at the
time the drugs were seized from the cab area. The Kleenex and cigarette boxes in which
the drugs were found were easily accessible to defendants inside the cab of the pickup
during their drive from Ogden to the railroad tracks in Brigham City. Moreover, 1/4 inch
of one of the seized baggies protruded from the Kleenex box which was sitting on the
transmission hump in view of anyone in the pickup. The interior of the pickup was
otherwise clean, the only other object found being an eyeglass case. These facts, together
with the estimated $75.00 street value of the seized drugs, and the fact that Evans never
came to retrieve her truck, suggest that the drugs were not inadvertently left in the pickup
by another individual. As argued by the prosecutor below, a drug user is not going to
leave his drugs in the truck "so that anyone walking by could see [them]," or "where
anyone could pick [them] u p , . . . and throw [them] away, especially when those items
had value. Not only monetary value, but some intrinsic value to people who use drugs...
A drug user is not going to leave his drugs lying around for someone else tofind''(R.
266-67). Based on the facts of this case and the fair inferences therefrom, the jury
reasonably concluded that defendant and codefendant Timmerman possessed the seized
drugs.
C. Failure to Marshal
In claiming a paucity of the evidence, defendant wholly ignores the above
reasonable inferences which support the jury's verdict. See Br. of Aplt. at 7-9. In order

7

to establish a claim of insufficiency of the evidence, it is defendant's burden to marshal
all the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in support of the verdict and
demonstrate that, even viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence is
insufficient to support it. State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 819 (Utah App. 1994); State v.
Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1212 (Utah 1993). Indeed, "the process of marshaling evidence
serves the important function of reminding litigants and appellate courts of the broad
deference owed to the fact finder at trial. Such deference is especially appropriate where
the fact finder is a jury, whose common sense is a valued buffer between the parties."
State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 739 (Utah App. 1990). Because defendant ignores the
evidence and inferences favorable to the jury verdict here, he fails to meet his heavy
marshaling burden and his sufficiency claim should be rejected. See State v. Scheel, 823
P.2d 470,473 (Utah App. 1991) (refusing to consider sufficiency challenge due to
defendant's failure to marshal the evidence supporting his conviction and to demonstrate
why it was so inconclusive that a reasonable jury could not have convicted him).
D. No Other Culpable Individual
Even if the Court should determine to reach the merits of defendant's
sufficiency challenge, the evidence is adequate to establish that defendant and
codefendant jointly and constructively possessed the seized drugs. This is an admittedly
close case because the methamphetamine and marijuana were discovered inside benign
containers. However, the fact that the narcotic character of the substances was not
immediately apparent is not necessarily detrimental to the State's case. As detailed
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above, in Part B, supra, the drugs were easily accessible to the defendants who had
exclusive control of the pickup that morning. Salas, 820 P.2d at 1388. And, it is
unlikely, due to the $75.00 street value of the drugs, the uncluttered appearance of the
cab, and the fact that Evans never appeared to claim the truck, that the drugs had been
inadvertently left in the pickup by another party.
More importantly, the evidence in this case does not point toward any other
culpable individual. It is therefore distinguishable from the Fox case upon which
defendant relies. See Br. of Aplt. at 7-8. In Fox, police searched a home and adjacent
green house uncovering 2,850 marijuana plants. 709 P.2d at 318. The home belonged to
Gary Fox, but his brother Clive apparently had sleeping quarters in the home. Id. at 318,
320. Based on this evidence, the trial court convicted both Gary and Clive for possession
of a controlled substance. Id. at 317-18. On appeal, the supreme court overturned Give's
conviction due to insufficient evidence. Id. at 320. The supreme court determined that
collectively the facts of the case pointed toward Gary, not Clive, as the culprit: Gary
owned the property, Gary's room contained marijuana, drug paraphernalia and a book
entitled A Marijuana Grower's Guide. Id. at 318. While Clive may have had knowledge
of the existence of marijuana on the premises, such knowledge failed to indicate that he
was other than a bystander to his brother's criminality. Id. at 320. The comparatively
overwhelming evidence of Gary's dominion and control over the home destroyed any
inference that Clive jointly and constructively possessed the marijuana. Id.
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A case not cited by defendant, State v. Salas, 820 P.2d 1386 (Utah App.
1991), supports this distinction. Salas was convicted by a jury for cocaine possession
after police found a package of cocaine hidden in the back seat of the car he was driving.
820 P.2d 1386,1386-87 (Utah App. 1991). This court reversed Salas' conviction finding
that the furtive movements of a backseat passenger immediately prior to the traffic stop
and the recovery of the cocaine from a crevice in the backseat, an area inaccessible to
Salas as the driver, rendered the evidence insufficient to establish that Salas knew about
the cocaine. Id at 1388-89. The evidence suggested instead that the backseat passenger
hid the cocaine, which defeated the jury's inference that Salas also constructively
possessed it.
Unlike the defendants in Fox and Salas, the evidence supports the jury's
determination that the defendants jointly possessed the drugs seized from the cab of the
pickup. Furthermore, defendant and codefendant Timmerman did not implicate the other,
and did not point to another individual as a more likely culprit. Indeed, there is no
evidence linking the drugs discovered in the pickup to any person other than defendants,
the two people who had sole control of the pickup that morning. Although defendants
claimed that Evans would retrieve the truck, she did not do so. Further, the drugs were
found in two ofjust three items found inside the cab of the pickup, a Kleenex and a
cigarette box sitting in plain view on the transmission hump and floor area.
The facts that defendant and codefendant Timmerman were cooperative and
that police did not detect the odor of marijuana as they approached the pickup (R. 230-

m

32), do not destroy the jury's reasonable inference that the defendants' jointly and
constructively possessed the drugs. The odor of marijuana may be probative of a
possession charge, but it is not determinative. Cf State v. Warner, 788 P.2d 1041,104344 (Utah App. 1990) (holding that possession statute does not require possession of a
useable amount of narcotic). The jury was also entitled to ignore the defendants' selfserving statements that they knew nothing about the drugs. Cf Carlson, 635 P.2d at 74
(stating that trial court is not obliged to accept witnesses testimony).
CONCLUSION
Based on the above, the evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom
support the jury's determination that defendant and codefendant Timmerman jointly and
constructively possessed the drugs seized from the cab of the pickup. This Court should
so hold, thereby according the jury verdict proper deference.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Ik September 1997.
JAN GRAHAM
Utah Attorney General

MARIAN DECKER
Assistant Attorney General
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ADDENDUM

58-37-8

OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS

(25) All costs associated with recording and submitting data as required in
this section shall be assumed by the submitting drug outlet.
History: C. 1*53, SS-37-7.S, enacted by L.
1995, eh. 833, i 3.

Effective Date*. — Lswt 1995, eh. 333,14
makes the act effective on July 1,1995.

68-37.8- Prohibited acts — Penalties.
(1) Prohibited acts A—Penalties:
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to
knowingly and intentionally:
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to
produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance;
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree,
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit
substance;
(iii) possess a controlled substance in the course of his business as
a sales representative of a manufacturer or distributor of substances
listed in Schedules II through V except that he may possess such
controlled substances when they are prescribed to him by a licensed
practitioner; or
(iv) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to
distribute.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (IXa) with respect to:
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II is guilty of a second
degree felony and upon a second or subsequent conviction of Subsection (IXa) is guilty of a first degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is
guilty of a third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent
conviction punishable under this subsection is guilty of a second
degree felony; or
(iii) s substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction punishable
under this subsection is guilty of a third degree felony.
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful:
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a
controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or order, directlyfroma practitioner while acting in the course of
his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this subsection;
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any
building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place
knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons
unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in
any of those locations;
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to be present where
controlled substances are being used or possessed in violation of this
chapter and the use or possession it open, obvious, apparent, and not
concealedfromthose present; however, a person may not be convicted
under this subsection if the evidence shows that he did not use the
340
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substance himself or advise, encourage, or assist anyone else to do so;
any incidence of prior unlawful use of controlled substances by the
defendant may be admitted to rebut this defense;
(iv) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an
altered or forged prescription or written order for a controlled substance;
(v) for a practitioner licensed under this chapter knowingly and
intentionally to prescribe, administer, or dispense a controlled substance to a juvenile, without first obtaining the consent required in
Section 78-14-5 of a parent, guardian, or person standing in loco
parentis of the juvenile except in cases of an emergency; for purposes
of this subsection, a juvenile means a "child" as defined in Section
78-3a-2, and "emergency* means any physical condition requiring the
administration of a controlled substance for immediate relief of pain
or suffering;
(vi) for a practitioner licensed under this chapter knowingly and
intentionally to prescribe or administer dosages of a controlled substance in excess of medically recognized quantities necessary to treat
the ailment, malady, or condition of the ultimate user, or
(vii) for any person to prescribe, administer, or dispense any
controlled substance to another person knowing that the other person
is using a false name, address, or other personal information for the
purpose of securing the same.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2XaXi) with respect to:
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a
second degree felony;
•*
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or H, or marijuana, if the
amount is more than 16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, is guilty of
a third degree felony; or
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted
resin from any part of the plant, and the amount is more than one
ounce but less than 16 ounces, is guilty of a class A xnisdemeanor.
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2XaXi) while inside
the exterior boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility as
defined in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement
shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided in
Subsection (2Kb).
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of possession of any
controlled substance by a person previously convicted tinder Subsection
(2Kb), that person shall be sentenced to a one degree greater penalty than
provided in this subsection.
(e) Any person who violates Subsection (2XaXi) with respect to all other
controlled substances not included in Subsection (2XbXi), (ii), or (iii),
including less than one ounce of maryuana, is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor. l)pon a second conviction for possession of a controlled
substance as provided in this subsection, the person is guilty of s class A
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction he is guilty of a
third degree felony.
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsections (2XaXii) through
(2XaXvii)is:
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor;
241
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(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree
felony.
(3) Prohibited acts C — Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful for any person:
(i) who is subject to this chapter to distribute or dispense a
controlled substance in violation of this chapter;
(ii) who is a licensee to manufacture, distribute, or dispense a
controlled substance to another licensee or other authorized person
not authorized by his license;
(iii) to omit, remove, alter, or obliterate a symbol required by this
chapter or by a rule issued under this chapter;
(iv) to refuse or fail to make, keep, or furnish any record, notification, order form, statement, invoice, or information required under
this chapter; or
(v) to refuse entry into any premises for inspection as authorized by
this chapter.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3Xa) shall be punished
by a civil penalty of not more than $5,000. The proceedings are independent of, and not in lieu of, criminal proceedings under this chapter or any
other law of this state. If the violation is prosecuted by information or
indictment which alleges the violation was committed knowingly or
intentionally, that person is upon conviction guilty of a third degree felony.
(4) Prohibited acts D — Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally:
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a
controlled substance a license number which is fictitious, revoked,
suspended, or issued to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining
a controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent himself to
be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian, or other authorized person;
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to
procure the administration of, to obtain a prescription for, to prescribe
or dispense to any person known to be attempting to acquire or obtain
possession of, or to procure the administration of any controlled
substance by misrepresentation or failure by the person to disclose his
receiving any controlled substance from another source,fraud,forgery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or written order
for a controlled substance, or the use of a false name or address;
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a
controlled substance, or to utter the same, or to alter any prescription
or written order issued or written under the terms of this chapter,
(iv) to furnish false or fraudulent material information in any
application, report, or other document required to be kept by this
chapter or to willfully make any false statement in any prescription,
order, report, or record required by this chapter; or
(v) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or
other thing designed to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark,
trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or
any likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or
labeling so as to render any drug a counterfeit controlled substance.
242
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(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (4Xa) is guilty of a
third degree felony.
(5) Prohibited acts E — Penalties:
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not
authorized under this chapter who commits any met declared to be
unlawful under this section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances
Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and classifications under
Subsection (5Kb) if the act is committed:
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the
grounds of any of those schools;
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or post-secondary
institution or on the grounds of any of those schools or institutions;
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other
structure or grounds which are, at the time of the act, being used for
an activity sponsored by or through a school or institution under
Subsections (5XaXi) and (ii);
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility;
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center;
(vi) in a church or synagogue;
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater,
movie house, playhouse, or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto;
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure;
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included
in Subsections (5XaXi) through (viii); or
(x) with a person younger than 18 years of age, regardless of where
the act occurs.
(b) A person convicted under this subsection is guilty of a first degree
felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of not less thanfiveyears if the
penalty that would otherwise have been established but for this subsection
would have been a first degree felony. Imposition or execution of the
sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for parole
until the minimum term of imprisonment under this subsection has been
served.
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established
would have been less than a first degree felony but for this subsection, a
person convicted under this subsection is guilty of one degree more than
the maximum penalty prescribed for that offense.
(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this subsection that the
actor mistakenly believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at
the time of the offense or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor
that the actor mistakenly believed that the location where the act occurred
was not as described in Subsection (5Xa) or was unaware that the location
where the act occurred was as described in Subsection (5Xa).
(6) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class
B misdemeanor.
(7) Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense unlawful
under this chapter is upon conviction guilty of one degree less than the
maximum penalty prescribed for that offense.
(8) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, and
not in lieu of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by
law.
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(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of
another state, conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of
another state for the same act is a bar to prosecution in this state.
(9) (a) When it appears to the court at the time of sentencing any person
convicted under this chapter that the person has previously been convicted
of an offense under the laws of this state, the United States, or another
state, which if committed in this state would be an offense within this
chapter and it appears that probation would not be of benefit to the
defendant or that probation would be contrary to the interest, welfare, or
protection of aociety, the court, notwithstanding Section 77-18-1, may if
there is compliance with Subsection (9Xb), impose a minimum term to be
served by the defendant, of up to Vi the maximum sentence imposed by law
for the offense committed. For violations of this section, this subsection
supersedes Section 77-18-4.
(b) (i) Before any person may be sentenced to a minimum term as
provided in Subsection (9Xa), the prosecuting attorney, or grand jury
if an indictment, shall cause to be subscribed upon the complaint, in
misdemeanor cases, or the information or indictment, in addition to
the substantive offense charged, a statement setting forth the alleged
past conviction of the defendant and specifically stating the date and
place of conviction and the offense of which the defendant was
convicted. The allegation shall be presented to the defendant at the
time of his arraignment, or afterwards by leave of court, but in no
event later than two days prior to the trial of the offense charged or
the defendant's entering a plea of guilty. At the time of arraignment or
a later date when granted by the court, the court shall read the
allegation of the previous conviction to the defendant, provide him or
his counsel with a copy of it, and explain to the defendant the
consequences of the allegation under Subsection (9Xa). The allegation
of the past conviction of the defendant is not admissible in a jury trial,
except where the admissibility in evidence of a previous conviction is
otherwise recognized as admissible by law.
(ii) The court, following conviction of the defendant of the substantive offense charged and prior to imposing sentence, shall inform the
defendant of its decision to impose a minimum sentence under
Subsection (9Xa) and inquire as to whether the defendant admits or
denies the previous conviction. If the defendant denies the previous
conviction, the court shall afford him an opportunity to present
evidence showing that the allegation of the past conviction is erroneous or the conviction was lawfully vacated or the defendant was
pardoned. The evidence shall be made a matter of record. Following
the evidence, the court shall make a finding as to whether the
defendant has a previous conviction, whichfindingisfinal,except for
a showing of abuse of discretion. Following thefindingsby the court,
the defendant shall be sentenced under Subsection (9Xa) or under the
appropriate penalty provided by law, as the court in its discretion
determines.
(c) Any person sentenced on a second offense to probation who violates
that probation is subject to Subsections (9Xa) and (9Xb).
(d) For violations of this section, Subsection (9) supersedes Section
76-S-203.5.
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(10) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof
which shows a person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or dispensed a controlled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence
that the person or persons did so with knowledge of the character of the
substance or substances.
(11) Thi6 section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the
course of his professional practice only and not for humans,fromprescribing,
dispensing, or administering controlled substances orfromcausing the substances to be administered by an assistant or orderly under his direction and
supervision.
(12) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on:
(a) any person registered under the Controlled Substances Act who
manufactures, distributes, or possesses an imitation controlled substance
for use as a placebo or investigational new drug by a registered practitioner in the ordinary course of professional practice or research; or
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate
scope of his employment.
(13) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to
any person or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter
shall be given effect without the invalid provision or application.
History: I* 1*71, ch. 145,1 fc 1972, eh. t2, section (9Xd) which read "Nothing in this secI 1; 1977, ch. * M 6; 1979, eh. 12, I 6; 19S5, tion in any way lixniu or restricts Sections
ch. 146,1 1; 1986, ch. 196,1 1; 1987, ch. 92, 76-8-1001 and 76-8*1002."
Croes-Referenee*.—Cities and towns, pro*
f 100; 1987, ch. 190, I S; 1988, ch. 95, i 1;
1989, ch. SO, I 2; 1989, ch 56,1 1; 1989, ch.
176,1 1; 1989, ch. 167,1 1; 1989, ch. 901,1 1;
1990, ch. 161, f 1; 1990, ch. 163, I * 1990,
ch. 163,1 8; 1991, ch. SO, I 1; 1991, ch. 198,
f 4; 1991, ch. 968, i 7; 1995, ch. 984,1 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995, added the last
sentence is Subjection (9Xa) and rewrote Sub-

hibitioni of aaks of narcotics to minors, { 108-47.
Psychotoxic chemical solvent*, penalties for
use or sale, | 76-10*101 et seq.
Sentencing for felonies, | ( 76-3-201, 76-3203, 76-3-301.
Sentencing for misdemeanors, f { 76-3-201,
76-3-204, 76-3-301.
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68-87-8. Prohibited acts — Penalties.
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties:
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to
knowingly and intentionally:
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to
produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance;
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree,
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit
substance;
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to
distribute; or
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where:
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct
which results in any violation of any provision of Title 58,
Chapters 37, 87a, 87b, 87c, or 87d that is a felony; and
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or more
violations of Title 58, Chapters 37, S7a, 37b, 37c, or S7d on
separate occasions that are undertaken in concert with £ve or
more persons with respect to whom the person occupies a position
of organizer, supervisor, or any other position of management.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (IXa) with respect to:
(i) a substance classified an Schedule I or II or a controlled substance analog is guilty of a second degree felony and upon a second or
subsequent conviction is guilty of a first degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is
guilty of a third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent
conviction is guilty of a second degree felony; or
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of
a third degree felony.
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (lXaXrv) is guilty of a
first degree felony punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term
of not less than seven years and which may be for life. Imposition or
execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not
eligible for probation.
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful:
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a
controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or order, directlyfroma practitioner while acting in the course of
his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this subsection;
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any
building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place
knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons
unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in
any of those locations;
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an
altered or forged prescription or written order for a controlled substance.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2XaXi) with respect to:
(i) maryuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a
second degree felony;
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(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marijuana, if the
amount is more than 16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, or a
controlled substance analog, is guilty of a third degree felony; or
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted
resin from any part of the plant, and the amount is more than one
ounce but less than 16 ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2XaXi) while inside
the exterior boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility as
defined in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement
shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided in
Subsection (2Kb).
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of possession of any
controlled substance by a person, that person shall be sentenced to a one
degree greater penalty than provided in this subsection.
(e) Any person who violates Subsection (2XaXi) with respect to all other
controlled substances not included in Subsection (2XbXi), (ii), or (iii),
including less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor. Upon a second conviction the person is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction the person is
guilty of a third degree felony.
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2XaXii) or (2XaXiii) is:
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor;
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor, and
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree
felony.
(3) Prohibited acts C — Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally:
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a
controlled substance a license number which is fictitious, revoked,
suspended, or issued to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining
a controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent himself to
be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian, or other authorized person;
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to
procure the administration of, to obtain a prescription for, to prescribe
or dispense to any person known to be attempting to acquire or obtain
possession of, or to procure the administration of any controlled
substance by misrepresentation or failure by the person to disclose his
receiving any controlled substance from another source,fraud,forgery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or written order
for a controlled substance, or the use of a false name or address;
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a
controlled substance, or to utter the same, or to alter any prescription
or written order issued or written under the terms of this chapter, or
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or
other thing designed to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark,
trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or
any likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or
labeling so as to render any drug a counterfeit controlled substance.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3Xa) is guilty of a
third degree felony.
(4) Prohibited acts D — Penalty
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not
authorized under this chapter who commits any act declared to be
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unlawful under this section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances
Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and classifications under
Subsection (4Kb) if the act is committed:
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the
grounds of any of those schools;
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or poet-secondary
institution or on the grounds of any of those schools or institutions;
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other
structure or grounds which are, at the time of the act, being used for
an activity sponsored by or through a school or institution under
Subsections MXaXi) and (ii);
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility;
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center,
(vi) in a church or synagogue;
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater,
movie house, playhouse, or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto;
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure;
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included
in Subsections (4XaXi) through (viii); or
(z) with a person younger than 18 years of age, regardless of where
the act occurs.
(b) A person convicted under this subsection is guilty of a first degree
felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of not less thanfiveyears if the
penalty that would otherwise have been established but for this subsection
would have been a first degree felony Imposition or execution of the
sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for
probation.
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established
would have been less than a first degree felony but for this subsection, a
person convicted under this subsection is guilty of one degree more than
the maximum penalty prescribed for that offense.
(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this subsection that the
actor mistakenly believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at
the time of the offense or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor
that the actor mistakenly believed that the location where the act occurred
was not as described in Subsection (4Xa) or was unaware that the location
where the act occurred was as described in Subsection (4Xa).
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class
B misdemeanor.
(6) Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense unlawful
under this chapter is upon conviction guilty of one degree less than the
maximum penalty prescribed for that offense.
(7) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, and
not in lieu of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorised by
law.
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of
another state, conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of
another state for the same act is a bar to prosecution in this state.
(6) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof which
shows a person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or
dispensed a controlled substance or substances, is prima fade evidence that •
the person or persons did so with knowledge of the character of the substance
or substances.
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(9) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, is good faith and in the
course of his professional practice only and notforhumans, from prescribing,
dispensing, or administering controlled substances orfromcausing the substances to be administered by an assistant or orderly under his direction and
supervision.
(10) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on:
(a) any person registered under the Controlled Substances Act who
manufactures, distributes, or possesses an imitation controlled substance
for use as a placebo or investigational new drug by a registered practitioner in the ordinary course of professional practice or research; or
(b) any law enforcement Officer acting in the course and legitimate
scope of his employment
(11) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to
any person or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter
shall be given effect without the invalid provision or application.
History: L. 1*71, cb. 145, f S; 1*72, cb- 22,
I l;1977,ch.2M *; IS7S, cb-12,1 ft; 1*85,
cb-14*, I 1; 1SS6, cb. 1*6, | 1; 1*87, eh. S2,
I 100; 1*87, cb. ISO, I S; 1*88, eh. S5, I 1;
1*8$, eh. 50,1 2; 1*88, cb. S6,1 I; 1SSS, cb,
178, t l;l*6S,eb,lS7,f 2; 1*89, cb. S01, | 1;
1**0, cb, 161,1 1; 1**0, cb. 163, I *; l**0f
eh. 1SS, I 2; 1**1, cb. SO, I 1; 1*91, cb. 1*8,
I 4; 1*91, cb. S68, I 7; 1**5, cb. 2*4, I 1;
1S*6, cb. 1, | S; 1*97, cb. Si, I S.
Amendment Note*. — The 1*96 amendsent, affective January 31, 1*96, aubatituted
•minor* for •child" and nS-Sa-lWfbr ^S-Sa^*
in Subaection (2XaXv).
The 1997 amendment, affective May 5,1*97,
deleted fonner Subaection (IXaXiii) concerning
possession in the course of buaineaa, redeaigsating aubaectioni accordingly, added Subaection (lXaXiv); inaertad "or a controliad eub-

stance analog* in Subaectionj (lXbXi) and
(2XbXii)i added Subaection (1XO; deleted
former Subaection (2XaXiii) concerning being
present where oontroUad aubataneaa are being
seed, renumbering fubeectioni accordingly; delatedformerSubaectionj (2XaXv) to (vii) conoarning praacription offenaet; deleted former
Subaection (S) titled •Prohibited acta C • Penalties * renumbering and redesignating tbe following aubaectioni accordingly; deleted former
Subaection (eXaXiv) concerning furnishing
false information, redesignating aubaectioni
accordingly; aubatituted "probation" for "parole
until tbe minimum term of imprisonment under this subaection has been served" at tbe and
of present Subaection (4Kb); deleted former
Subaection (9) concerning sentencing, renumbering accordingly; and made numerous stylistic changes throughout tbe section.
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Search and eeixure.
Sentencing.
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Drug-free soma.
••^BurdenOTproof*
Tbe penalty enhancement provision, whieh
was enacted for tbe purpoae of creating "drug*
free tones* around schools, incorporataa quae*
tiooj of location and distance into tbe underlying offense, and tbe state must prove those
additional facta to tbe aame trier of fact wbo
ftnds defendant! guilty of poaaeaaion, distribution, or manufacture of a oontroUad aubatanca.
8ute v. Powatnik, SIS R2d 146 (Utab Ct App.
1996).
Search and eeiriire*
Trial court properly denied defendants motion to suppress marijuana and drug parapber-

Italia that bad not been seized in an illegal
eearch and seizure. Bute v. South, S32 P£d 622
(Utab Ct App. 1*97).
Because tbe public safety exception to tbe
Miranda requirement concerns tbe safety of tbe
general public and not tbe safety of a particular
defendant, it did not apply to tbe situation
where defendant, convicted of possession, re*
eponded affirmatively to officers question
whether be was on heroin before be was
mirandiied; thus, statement should have been
suppreaaed. State v. Montoya, S14 Utab Adv.
Rep. 54 (Utah Ct App. 1997).
Because probable cause and exigent drcum*
stances, requiring initial and then further in*
ventory eearch of defendant's car, were nonexistent once vehicle was impounded, tbe denial
of defendant's motion to auppreas heroin diecovered in oar was reversed. State •.Montoya,
S14 Utab Adv. Rep. 64 (Utab Ct App. 1997).
Although alone, each of the factors of past
criminal activity, nervoueness, anger, and travelling back from a known drug community

